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ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Anti-Price Gouging Legislation on Supply Chain Dynamics 
Jason E. Maynard 
 The purpose of this thesis is to model the effects of anti-price gouging 
(APG) legislation on the costs to businesses during the recovery period of a 
disaster.  A system dynamics model of a business’s replenishment procedures is 
used to simulate the effects of APG legislation on business performance.  
Economists have published expansive research on the effects of price ceilings on 
supply and demand, but there is little research evidence on the operational 
consequences of price ceiling legislation on business costs.  APG legislation 
increases consumer’s forward buying and shortage gaming after a disaster by 
removing price incentives to be frugal.  Forward buying and shortage gaming are 
two key drivers of the demand variation and the bullwhip effect, which leads to 
increased inventory costs, misguided capacity expansion and reduced service 
levels.  These costs have a negative impact on local businesses that are critical to 
a community’s economic health and recovery from a disaster.  The simulation 
results from this thesis show that APG legislation is not an effective regulatory 
response to decrease the impact of disasters on affected communities. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Anti-price gouging legislation, supply chain dynamics, disaster 
recovery planning, beer game  
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would to thank my advisor, Dr. Reza Pouraghabagher, for encouraging 
me to focus on an area with a positive impact on the humanitarian research.  I 
would also like to thank Dr. Unny Menon and Dr. Roya Javadpour for their 
contributions and feedback as my thesis committee members.  Lastly, I want to 
thank my family for their love and support through my time at Cal Poly.  
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Tables ....................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review .................................................................................. 4 
2.1 Disaster Management Research .................................................................... 4 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 4 
What is Disaster Management Research? ....................................................... 5 
Current State of Disaster Management Research ............................................ 6 
Discussion ........................................................................................................ 8 
2.2 Systems Analysis........................................................................................... 9 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 9 
System Thinking and Soft Operations Research ........................................... 10 
System Dynamics .......................................................................................... 11 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Anti-Price Gouging Legislation .................................................................. 12 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 12 
Price Controls ................................................................................................ 13 
Anti-Price Gouging Legislation..................................................................... 13 
Current Anti-Price Gouging Legislation in the United States ....................... 14 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 15 
2.4 Supply Chain Management and The Beer Game ........................................ 16 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 16 
The Bullwhip Effect in the Real World ......................................................... 17 
History of the Beer Game .............................................................................. 18 
Description The Beer Game .......................................................................... 18 
Patterns of Behavior in the Beer Game ......................................................... 21 
Causes of the Bullwhip Effect ....................................................................... 22 
Reducing the Bullwhip Effect ....................................................................... 23 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 24 
2.5 Simulating the Beer Game with System Dynamics .................................... 25 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 25 
vii 
 
The Beer Game System Dynamics Model .................................................... 26 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 30 
2.6 Economic Analysis of Anti-Price Gouging Legislation .............................. 31 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 31 
Supply and Demand Model ........................................................................... 32 
Macroeconomic Analysis of Price Ceilings .................................................. 32 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 35 
2.7 Summary ..................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter 3: Methodology ....................................................................................... 38 
Introduction ................................................................................................... 38 
System Dynamics Simulation Model ............................................................ 38 
Metrics ........................................................................................................... 41 
Test Cases ...................................................................................................... 42 
Assumptions .................................................................................................. 43 
Chapter 4: Results ................................................................................................. 46 
Inventory Level Results ................................................................................. 46 
Order Rate Results ......................................................................................... 49 
Units Sold, Price and Demand Results .......................................................... 52 
Player Performance Results ........................................................................... 54 
Discussion ...................................................................................................... 55 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work .............................................................. 58 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 58 
Future Work and Closing Remarks ............................................................... 60 
Works Cited .......................................................................................................... 63 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................... 68 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................... 75 
Appendix C ........................................................................................................... 81 
Appendix D ........................................................................................................... 83 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Effective inventory statistics summary .................................................... 48 
Table 2 Vensim equations for beer game model (Kirkwood, 2010) ..................... 68 
Table 3 Vensim equations for the integrated supply chain model ........................ 70 
Table 4 Effective inventory for Case I (No legislation) ....................................... 75 
Table 5 Effective inventory for Case II (Price rigidity) ........................................ 76 
Table 6 Effective inventory for Case III (APG legislation) .................................. 77 
Table 7 Orders placed for Case I (No legislation) ................................................ 78 
Table 8 Orders placed for Case II (Price rigidity) ................................................ 79 
Table 9 Orders placed for Case III (APG legislation) .......................................... 80 
Table 10 Anti-price gouging legislation by state (Davis, 2008) ........................... 83 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Percentage of DMR by methodology (Altay & Green III, 2006) ............. 7 
Figure 2 Percentage of DMR by research type (Altay & Green III, 2006) ............ 7 
Figure 3 Percentage of DMR by disaster stage (Altay & Green III, 2006) ............ 8 
Figure 4 Beer game flow chart.............................................................................. 19 
Figure 5 Beer game board ..................................................................................... 20 
Figure 6 Beer game stock and flow diagram (Kirkwood, 2010) .......................... 29 
Figure 7 Beer game stock and flow diagram Pg.2 (Kirkwood, 2010) .................. 30 
Figure 8 Traditional supply and demand model of price ceilings ........................ 34 
Figure 9 Causal diagram of dynamic supply and demand model ......................... 40 
Figure 10 Stock and flow diagram for market integrated supply chain model ..... 41 
Figure 11 Effective inventory levels for Case I, II and III. ................................... 46 
Figure 12 Orders placed at each supply chain location ........................................ 49 
Figure 13 Order deviation from actual demand for Case I and Case III ............... 50 
Figure 14 Demand and price results ..................................................................... 52 
Figure 15 Total units sold at retailer ..................................................................... 53 
Figure 16 Retailer profit and revenue ................................................................... 54 
Figure 17 Total supply chain cost ......................................................................... 54 
 
MAYNARD: THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMICS 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Regions that have been affected by disasters are characterized by 
turbulence, uncertainty and compassion for those who have been affected.  Local 
businesses are faced with the daunting task and added responsibility of providing 
goods that are critical to the wellbeing of their communities, while simultaneously 
adapting to new challenges and costs that threaten their existence.  Disasters are 
low probability, but high impact events that have huge ramifications on business 
performance, but are often underprepared for because of their infrequent and 
random nature.   
Anti-price gouging (APG) legislation is a type of state enforced price 
ceiling implemented during a government declared state of emergency.  APG 
legislation prevents local businesses from raising prices on energy and general 
goods above pre-emergency prices.  Thirty-one US states have enacted APG 
legislation in the last thirty years in order to protect those affected by disasters.  
APG legislation is implemented with the intention of reducing two potential 
consequences of a shortage created by a disaster.  (1) To protect those who are in 
poverty from price increases that could prevent them from securing essential 
goods or services and (2) prevent businesses from unfairly profiting from those 
who are subjected to shortages in supply after a disaster.  
Traditional macroeconomic analysis of price ceilings has been used to 
show the negative effects of price controls on incentives for businesses to acquire 
additional supply lines and removal of value-based market allocation 
mechanisms.  Savings through price ceilings are dispersed through additional 
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allocation costs, such as the cost of waiting in lines.  Additionally, 
macroeconomic analysis shows that price ceilings actually exacerbate shortages 
because of diminished or eliminated incentives for suppliers to secure new 
capacity and removal of incentives for consumers to ration the remaining 
supplies.  Although there has been ample research into macroeconomic affects of 
price controls, there is a significant lack of research on the operational effects on 
business processes.  In an investigation of price gouging done by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) after Hurricane Katrina there was no analysis of the 
additional operational costs to businesses caused by volatile demand conditions 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2006).  This research addresses the operational 
consequences of APG legislation on businesses in areas affected by a disaster. 
APG legislation increases costs in a supply chain by removing the 
mechanism of price fluctuation to dampen demand volatility after a disaster.  
Fears of supply shortages after a disaster propagate severe demand variations, 
leading to large variations in ordering patterns for retailers in the affected area.  
Demand spikes are amplified in upstream suppliers in a phenomenon known as 
the bullwhip effect.  The bullwhip effect causes demand shifts to be amplified 
through a supply chain, creating deviations between actual and perceived demand 
that increase inventory and capacity investment costs, while simultaneously 
reducing service levels.   
By hampering local business profitability, APG legislation reduces the 
ability of a region’s economy to recover from a disaster and may prolong the 
suffering of those affected.  In order to model the effects of APG legislation, two 
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methodologies are utilized.  A traditional economic supply and demand model is 
used to show the macroeconomic effects of APG legislation.  Next, a system 
dynamics model of the beer game integrated with a dynamic pricing model is 
used to analyze the effects of demand spikes on inventory levels and costs with 
and without APG legislation.  This thesis supplements disaster recovery research 
and economic analysis of price controls to give legislators a more complete view 
of the causes of poor economic performance and business failure stemming from 
conditions of high demand volatility after a disaster.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Thoughtful leaders increasingly recognize that we are not only 
failing to solve the persistent problems we face, but are in fact 
causing them.  System dynamics is designed to help avoid such 
policy resistance and identify high-leverage policies for sustained 
improvement. 
(Sterman, 2002) 
2.1 DISASTER MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past five years, major natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami in 2004, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and the earthquakes in 
Qinghai, China and Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2010 and many other smaller scale 
disasters have led to an increasing evaluation of disaster management research.  
Disasters pose major threats to human life, personal property, infrastructure and 
regional economic performance.  Often, the people who are affected the most by 
disasters are the poor and disenfranchised, who lack the means necessary to 
improve their situations.  To date there has been little research of disaster 
recovery issues in management science or operations research literature.  
This section explores the current state of research into disaster 
management.  Disaster management research is focused on improving 
communities that have been marginalized by disasters or emergencies through 
strategies that address mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.   Disaster 
management research aids in managing and allocating resources and information 
to aid people and businesses that are affected in the wake of a disaster.  The 
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research in this area is targeted at those who have management authority over 
response efforts, such as governments, aid agencies and businesses.   
WHAT IS DISASTER MANAGEMENT RESEARCH? 
Disaster management research (DMR) activities fall into four sets that are 
performed before, in prediction of, during, and after a disaster or mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery, respectively (Altay & Green III, 2006).  
DMR is concerned with issues that go beyond routine response to emergencies of 
paramedics, police and fire departments.  DMR is aimed at discovering 
improvements to the architecture, processes, policies and tools that are used in the 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery to emergencies (Quarantelli, 
1988).  The application of quantitative decision modeling techniques, such as 
operations research (OR) and management science (MS), can be applied 
effectively to disaster management research to improve the disaster outcomes 
(Bryson, Millar, Joseph, & Mobolurin, 2002). 
 Winston defines management science and operations research as a 
scientific approach to decision making which seeks to determine how best to 
design and operate a system, usually under conditions requiring the allocation of 
scarce resources (Winston, 1997).  In the case of disaster management, the goal is 
preventing loss of human life, reducing its impact on the economy, and returning 
to a state of normalcy.  Response to earthquakes, hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, 
tsunamis, floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, famines, man-made 
disasters and biological and technological disasters are all covered under the 
domain of disaster management research (Quarantelli, 1998).   
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CURRENT STATE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
A survey done on the current state of academic research done on disaster 
management research shows that it covers a range of methodologies including 
(Altay & Green III, 2006): 
• Mathematical, Constraint & Stochastic Programming 
• Probability and Statistics 
• Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) 
• Simulation 
• Decision & Queuing Theory 
• Fuzzy Sets 
• Expert Systems 
• Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
• Systems Dynamics 
Figure 1 below shows a breakdown of the areas of study for DMR.  
Mathematical programming and heuristic approaches to solutions are the most 
heavily researched, followed closely by statistics and probability research.  The 
most under-researched areas are system dynamics, constraint programming and 
soft operations research.  Soft operations research is the study of methods for 
strategic planning, decision support systems and problem structuring methods 
(PSM), where mathematical modeling and simulation are not appropriate or will 
not suffice (Lancaster University - Management School, 2010). 
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Figure 1 Percentage of DMR by methodology (Altay & Green III, 2006) 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 below are a breakdown of the applications and 
disaster stages covered in the academic literature for operations research (OR) and 
management science (MS).  Modeling is the most studied and application is the 
least studied area of OR/MS, at 58% and 13% of peer reviewed journal papers, 
respectively.  The most heavily OR/MS researched disaster stage is the mitigation 
stage and the least studied area is the recovery stage at 44% and 11% of peer 
reviewed journal papers, respectively.   
 
Figure 2 Percentage of DMR by research type (Altay & Green III, 2006) 
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Figure 3 Percentage of DMR by disaster stage (Altay & Green III, 2006) 
There is a need to address problems with respect to the development of 
coordination between business and government in areas affected by disasters 
(Quarantelli, 1986).  The area in dire need for more research is the disaster 
recovery stage (Altay & Green III, 2006).  Only one article on recovery planning 
was published in main stream operations research and management science 
journals (Bryson, Millar, Joseph, & Mobolurin, 2002).   The definition of 
recovery planning is “any activity that involves the actions taken in the long term 
after the immediate impact of the disaster has passed to stabilize the community 
and to restore some semblance of normalcy” (Altay & Green III, 2006).  Not 
surprisingly, this area of research is also the most appropriate for applications of 
fuzzy systems, system dynamics and soft operations research, which are the most 
underutilized methodologies in the current academic research in this field.   
DISCUSSION 
Based on the state of the current research, there is a need to further 
modeling of government policy effects on disaster recovery.  The recovery stage 
of DMR includes the policies, procedures and regulations that are used after a 
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disaster to restore a community to a state of normalcy.  This area of research is 
critical to ensuring organizations operate effectively during the aftermath of a 
disaster (Bryson, Millar, Joseph, & Mobolurin, 2002).  There is a need for 
research into coordination between government and private sector in addressing 
disaster issues.  One such interoperating policy is anti-price gouging (APG) 
legislation.  APG legislation is an area where state government regulation affects 
private sector decision making during the recovery stage of a disaster.   
APG legislation is enacted after a disaster in a state of emergency (SOE) 
and mandates constraints on prices that retailers can charge for goods and services 
after a disaster.  This directly affects decision making of consumers and 
businesses during an economic recovery from a disaster.   Research into APG 
legislation involves modeling of policy effects, which is often difficult to 
accomplish because of their inherent complex nature, nonlinearities and numerous 
intangibles (Mingers & Resenhead, 2004).  In order to create a framework to 
evaluate the effects of APG legislation on business costs, a soft operations 
research and system dynamics methodology is utilized, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
2.2 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
In our complex world, the ability to evaluate problems holistically is 
becoming increasingly critical.  Psychological studies have identified numerous 
cognitive, temporal and other limitations, which inhibit human’s ability to make 
rational choices in complex environments causing errors and biases in judgment 
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and choice (Sterman, 1989).  System dynamics and soft operations research are 
designed to help decision makers test their assumptions about outcomes in 
complex systems.  Soft OR techniques are aptly suited to the modeling of 
complex environments allowing for more influential and cohesive mental models 
that lead to more thorough analysis.  
A system is defined as an integrated series of parts or processes with a 
defined goal (Scholtes, 1998).  In order to evaluate the effects of APG legislation 
on supply chain costs, the system is studied is the replenishment decision making 
process of a business.  Supply chain is an umbrella term used for the activities a 
business undertakes in order to link their supply of goods with customer demand.  
Complex organizational systems, such as supply chains, can often produce 
behavior and results that are not intuitive by nature and can benefit from system 
analysis techniques.   
SYSTEM THINKING AND SOFT OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
Soft operations research has evolved during the last decade in a reaction to 
the inability of hard operations research to address issues of increased complexity 
that cannot be modeled with traditional operations research (OR) techniques 
(Forrester, 1994).  In many of these more complex realms the application of linear 
programming, queuing theory, regression analysis, scheduling algorithms and 
Monte Carlo simulation cannot capture the dynamic nature of processes in the real 
world (Forrester, 1994). 
Traditional scientific approaches to problem solving emphasize looking 
for causal chains rather than loops.  This creates a process that continually looks 
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for the cause of an event, but inevitably there is another event that caused a 
previous event (Senge, 1990).  System thinking and soft OR emphasizes 
identifying patterns of behavior and then determining the structures that propagate 
those patterns, which allows for sustaining changes in patterns of behavior.  There 
is a symbiotic relationship between a soft OR and system thinking approaches to 
problem solving and the system dynamics modeling framework.  The 
combination of techniques allows for common mental models of a system to be 
created and tested (Forrester, 1994).   
SYSTEM DYNAMICS   
System dynamics is a methodology and computer simulation technique for 
framing, understanding, and discussing complex issues and problems.  The 
benefits of the system dynamics simulation framework is that it can accept 
complexity, non linearity and feedback loop structures that are inherent in social, 
political and physical systems.  By creating a common quantitative mental model, 
a team of analysts can test the assumptions and evaluate the effects of changes in 
variables, structures and policies.  The fields of economics, social science, IT, 
management and engineering all contribute to the bodies of knowledge that 
contribute to the behavior of social, economic and business systems (Forrester, 
1961).  System dynamics helps bridge the gap between disciplines, allowing for 
collaboration and simulation of test scenarios within these environments.  
DISCUSSION 
System thinking and soft OR involves gaining a deep understanding of 
how systems function.  Although this is a critical first step, this process lacks a 
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quantitative base and instead relies solely on intuition and discussion.  System 
dynamics creates a flexible quantitative framework that allows for rigorous testing 
of mental models.  For this reason, system dynamics is an apt methodology to 
simulate the effects of APG legislation on disaster recovery.  Business failure and 
its subsequent consequences can rarely be linked to a single cause, but in difficult 
financial times created by a disaster, understanding the operational effects of 
legislation will aid economists and policy makers in understanding the macro 
effects of their decisions.  System dynamics has a flexible simulation framework 
that can accept the relationships necessary to model in complex legislative and 
social environments.   
A system dynamics simulation will be used to create a testable mental 
model for the effects of APG legislation on supply chain dynamics.  This will 
allow legislators to evaluate the long term effects of their decisions on business 
costs and to better understand the affects of policies on everyday business 
functions.  In order to accurately model the effects of APG legislation, the details 
of the legislation are summarized in the next section. 
2.3 ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This section provides details on price control and anti-price gouging 
(APG) legislation in the United States.  APG legislation is a type of state enforced 
price ceiling that is enacted when a state of emergency (SOE) is declared.  The 
legislation is intended to prevent businesses from raising prices for critical goods 
and energy supplies during shortages created by a disaster.  The history of price 
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controls and its relevance to modern day APG legislation is covered.  The details 
of APG legislation and their extent in the United States are then summarized.   
PRICE CONTROLS 
 Government enforced price controls have had a long history, dating back 
to medieval monarchies fixing the maximum price of bread, to recent years where 
the United States have fixed the price of gasoline, the rent on apartments in New 
York City, and the wages of unskilled labor (Rockoff, 1984).  Price controls, 
particularly price ceilings are implemented out of concern for groups who may 
have difficulty securing resources necessary to obtain critical goods and services 
(Rockoff, 2008). 
ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION 
The price controls that are focused on in this thesis are a type of price 
ceiling legislation called anti-price gouging (APG) legislation.  APG legislation is 
state level legislation that is enacted in a state of emergency (SOE) or during 
abnormal market conditions.  APG legislation prevents businesses from 
increasing prices above either pre-emergency prices or a percentage increase of 
the initial price before the disaster.  The legislation is only effective when there 
are pressures for prices to increase in the time of a shortage and do not prevent 
prices from decreasing below the pre-disaster levels. 
Politicians are often under pressure to enact APG legislation to show 
compassion for those affected (Davis, 2008).  Although economists generally 
disagree with price ceilings because they tend to aid some consumers and hurt 
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others, price controls hold the promise of protecting groups that are particularly 
hard-pressed to meet price increases (Rockoff, 2008).   
CURRENT ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 In 2008, thirty-one states had active APG legislation with varying 
regulation on prices and goods covered by the regulation (Davis, 2008).  16 of the 
31 state’s APG legislation have been enacted in the last 10 years, many coming in 
response to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina.  The fines for price gouging range from 
$1,000 to $10,000 per infraction and up to a year in prison for those found guilty.   
 APG legislation is not always in effect.  Fifteen out of the thirty-one states 
activate the legislation when a state of emergency (SOE) is declared.  The 
remaining states define the active legislation time more ambiguously, with 
triggering events such as “abnormal economic conditions”, “market disruption” or 
“in the event of a disaster.”  The goods covered under APG legislation are 
generally similar.  Twenty-four out of the thirty-one states laws apply to general 
goods and energy resources.  Indiana, Massachusetts and Vermont legislation 
only covers petroleum and energy products.   
A survey of the legislation shows that there is some variation in the way 
that states define price gouging.  Eighteen out of the thirty-one states define 
gouging as any level that is above pre-emergency prices and 8 out of the 31 define 
gouging as any prices that is more than 10-25% higher than pre-emergency prices.  
The remaining states define gouging in a much more ambiguous way.  These 
states describe price gouging as price that is “unconscionably” or “exorbitantly” 
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excessive.  A full summary of APG legislation by state can be found in Appendix 
D. 
DISCUSSION 
There is APG legislation in the majority of US states.  The goal of APG 
legislation is to prevent anti-competitive behavior and protect consumers after a 
disaster.  The details of when APG legislation is enacted and the severity of 
penalties vary slightly state by state.  This thesis will adopt the most common 
definition of price gouging, which is an increase in prices above pre-emergency 
levels.  For modeling purposes, the pre-emergency prices will in effect be the 
price ceiling, causing effectively upward price rigidity after the disaster and it is 
assumed that the penalties are severe enough and enforcement is effective enough 
that businesses are deterred from breaking the law.  Additionally, it is assumed 
that legislation is in effect from the time of the disaster occurrence and prices do 
not shift in anticipation of the disaster.  
Retailers are not strategically set up for shipments of inventory between 
stores; therefore there will be cost increases for labor, shipping and the additional 
risk associated with increasing supplies to a disaster area.  If prices remain at their 
pre-disaster levels, there may be no incentives to redirect supplies.  In order for 
profit driven retailers, wholesalers and distributors to pack up their inventory in 
stores outside of emergency areas and ship them to the affected area, there must 
be a financial incentive to do so.  The investigation done by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) into allegations of price gouging after Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita found that the increase in gas prices was mainly due to increased costs of 
MAYNARD: THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMICS 
 
16 
 
production and supply in disaster environments (Federal Trade Commission, 
2006). 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation into allegations of 
price gouging took into account the increased costs of redirecting supplies to a 
disaster area, but failed to account for the increased costs of responding to volatile 
demand conditions in a disaster market.  Demand management in disaster areas is 
difficult to predict and there can be significant increases in costs of operation 
(Wassenhove, 2006 & Kovacs & Spens, 2007).  Volatile demand patterns lead to 
increased inventory costs, capacity expenditures and reduced service levels.  
These operational costs are exacerbated by the implementation of APG 
legislation, which amplify demand variations through the removal of price 
fluctuation that serves to smooth demand.  
2.4 SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE BEER GAME 
INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this section is to provide background on the processes that 
businesses use to manage their supply chains and how these processes and 
decisions can be modeled.  A supply chain is defined by the Association for 
Operations Management (APICS) as the network used to deliver products and 
services from raw materials to end customers through an engineered flow of 
information, physical distribution and capital (Association for Operations 
Management (APICS), 2008).  The traditional supply chain consists of suppliers, 
producers, distributors and customers.  These units are linked through the flow of 
material downstream and the flow of information upstream with the goal of 
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linking supply with demand.  In a traditional supply chain, each location is 
responsible for determining the quantity of goods to order to satisfy their demand 
independently of other units in the supply chain. 
Over the past 20 years, supply chain transaction costs have been reduced 
dramatically and there has been an increased interest in optimizing how 
organizations collaborate to improve efficiency (Towill, 1996).  This has led to a 
host of research into the patterns of behavior exhibited by players in supply chains 
in order to reduce the negative behaviors.  The beer game is a common simulation 
of the dynamic effects of a supply chain.  The game is used as a representation of 
an organization’s supply chain in order to model the bullwhip effect. 
THE BULLWHIP EFFECT IN THE REAL WORLD 
Significant amplifications in upstream orders, inventory and backlog is a 
pattern that was first identified in real supply chains.  Procter & Gamble identified 
the behavior, which is now coined as the “bullwhip” effect, in its consumer goods 
supply chains.  Procter and Gamble realized that although the demand at the 
retailer for their Pampers baby diaper line was fairly constant, there was a 
significant increase in the amplification of orders at the wholesaler (Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997).  Hewlett Packard saw similar effects when 
evaluating their printer business.  There were small shifts in demand at their retail 
level, but at the reseller level the swings were amplified and further upstream in 
their supply chain, in the integrated circuit business, the amplifications in demand 
were even larger. 
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HISTORY OF THE BEER GAME 
 The beer game is a simplified representation of a supply chain for generic 
manufactured goods that replicates the patterns of behavior exhibited in real 
supply chains.  The game has been played by thousands of people, all over the 
world from high school students to CEOs of major corporations.  The beer game 
serves as a platform to study the dynamic effects that structure and delays can 
have on a supply chain (Sterman, 1992).  The game serves as a useful 
representation for studying the effects of visibility and delays in information and 
material flows.  The following section has a brief overview of the beer game and 
the detailed rules for the beer game can be found in Appendix C. 
The large swings in demand and amplification in orders cause results in 
supply chains that are far from optimal because of wasteful overproduction and 
excess inventory.  Despite this, the same patterns in the beer game are exhibited 
by almost all players, which suggest that all players in that structure use similar 
heuristics and systematically err in the same manner (Sterman, 1989).  The 
structure of the game causes patterns of behavior, not the cunning of the people 
who are involved in the decision making. 
DESCRIPTION THE BEER GAME 
 The beer game is a role playing game that portrays the replenishment and 
ordering processes used in a supply chain.  Beer (commonly root beer in 
classroom settings) is the generic manufactured good that is produced and 
distributed through the supply chain.  The chain consists of a retailer (R), 
distributer (D), wholesaler (W) and factory (F).  Each segment of the chain places 
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orders for beer to satisfy their demand independently without knowledge of the 
decision making at the other locations in the chain.  The retailer, whose goal is to 
fulfill market customer demand for beer, places orders with the wholesaler in an 
attempt to maintain their inventory.  The wholesaler’s customer is the retailer.  
The wholesaler tries to maintain their inventory by placing orders with the 
distributor.  Finally, the distributor places orders with the factory.  The factory 
brews the beer and obtains its raw materials from a source that is outside of the 
scope of the simulation.  Figure 4 shows the flow of information and physical 
goods through the beer supply chain. 
RetailerWholesalerDistributorFactory
Raw 
material 
suppliers
Customers
Flow of goods
Flow of information
 
Figure 4 Beer game flow chart 
 The beer game uses lead times of two weeks (represented as two moves) 
between an order being placed and an order being received.  This simulates the 
cumulative lead time for processing, packing and shipping of units.  Each week, 
the inventory at each location is depleted by the demand created at a downstream 
location and the participants in the game attempt to maintain their inventory levels 
as close to safety stock levels as possible.  There are penalty costs of $0.50 per 
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unit per week of inventory that is held and a penalty cost of $1.00 per unit per 
week of backlog or essentially the inability to meet current demand from a 
downstream location.  The goal of the game is to minimize the penalty costs 
incurred by maintaining the inventory at the minimum safety stock level while 
satisfying all of the demand of the next downstream location.  The game makes 
the simplifying assumption of no variation in production times or delays and any 
capacity or financial constraints.  
Used Order 
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Figure 5 Beer game board 
Figure 5 above shows the traditional beer game board.  Units of beer move 
one space per time unit, which represents one week in the game.  In the first 
round, each location in the supply chain acts independently without collaboration 
or knowledge of what is happening at the locations adjacent to them.  This means 
that each location has no knowledge of the inventories or backlogs of other 
locations when they are placing their own orders.  This is the case in many 
traditional supply chains.  The game starts at time 0 and every simulated week 
each player makes decisions on how much beer to order.  The game is played for 
a total of 36 weeks or moves.  
Participants playing the beer game consistently replicate the common 
phenomenon of oscillation, phase lag and amplification in inventory levels and 
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ordering rates.  The beer game shows how ordering decisions within a supply 
chain systematically diverge from optimum behavior during a demand shift 
without collaboration (Sterman, 1989). 
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR IN THE BEER GAME 
 Results from thousands of trials of the beer game illustrate common 
decision making characteristics that cause the system to depart dramatically from 
optimum behavior.  The three common patterns that the beer game reveals are (1) 
oscillation, (2) amplification and (3) phase lag in orders and inventory levels.   
1. Oscillation is the general characteristic of the supply chain system without 
collaboration.  Oscillation in inventory levels and ordering rates around a 
target value represents instability created by delays in information and 
shipping.  This pattern often causes effective inventory levels that go well 
into the negative also known as backlog or unfulfilled orders. 
2. Amplification is the increase in the peak order rates in each upstream 
location in the supply chain from retailer to factory.  The peak amplitude 
of orders at the factory can be double the amplitude of the orders at the 
retailer (McCullen & Towill, 2002).  Sterman has noted that the variance 
in the orders at the factory can be five times the variance at the retailer 
(Sterman, 1992).   
3. Phase lag is a pattern of behavior characterized by peaks and troughs of 
the oscillating order rates at one location being out of sync with the peaks 
and troughs at an adjacent location.   
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CAUSES OF THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 
 Analysis of the beer game by numerous researchers has identified four 
major causes of the bullwhip effect (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997). 
 Demand forecast updating: Most businesses use some sort of forecasting 
method to determine future demand.  This method is the heuristic each 
player uses to project future demand.  Orders placed from downstream 
suppliers are used as a data point to project the upstream supplier’s future 
product demand.  Manager’s use downstream order signals to readjust 
their demand forecasts and the orders placed with the suppliers of the 
upstream operation.  When the lead times between order data adjustments 
are longer, the bullwhip effect is exaggerated. 
 Order batching: Orders are often accumulated into batches, which are 
then passed onto a supplier weekly, bi-weekly or even monthly.  
Businesses have an incentive not to order too frequently, especially when 
there is a high time and/or cost associated with order processing.  Periodic 
ordering can increase the variability in order rates, contributing 
significantly to the bullwhip effect. 
 Price fluctuation: Often suppliers will offer promotional pricing in order 
to reduce unwanted inventory or boost volume in order to meet efficiency 
goals.  Suppliers will periodically have special promotions like price 
discounts, quantity discounts, coupons, rebates, and so on, which creates 
forward buying in downstream customers.  This causes demand spikes in 
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downstream customers that then ripple up through the supply chain 
causing additional inefficiencies. 
 Rationing and shortage gaming: When product demand exceeds supply, a 
supplier will often ration its product to customers. Customers who suspect 
a supply shortage will often exaggerate their orders in an attempt to secure 
the actual desired amount of product in the case of a shortage, creating 
artificial demand spikes that are exaggerated through the supply chain. 
REDUCING THE BULLWHIP EFFECT 
 Understanding the causes of the bullwhip effect has led businesses to 
implement changes to mitigate its effects.  In order to reduce the effects of 
variation through demand forecasting businesses have recognized the need to 
improve information sharing.  Businesses have implemented techniques such as 
electronic data interchange (EDI) and collaborative forecasting planning and 
replenishment (CFPR) that allow upstream suppliers to see and match front-end 
demand.  Additionally, because long lead times can aggravate the bullwhip effect, 
businesses have placed a premium on improving operational efficiency to reduce 
lead times. 
 To diminish the effects of order batching on the bullwhip effect, 
companies have worked to implement systems that reduce the cost of order 
processing.  This allows for more frequent ordering, but does not address the 
increased transportation costs of increasing the number of orders.  To fully 
address these problems businesses must also reduce the costs associated with 
transportation of smaller batches.  Third party logistics and composite distribution 
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channels are used to create varied product mixes for transport allowing for smaller 
batches to be ordered without increased transport costs. 
 In order to reduce variations in demand caused by promotional pricing, 
many businesses have reduced wholesale price discounting in order to eliminate 
forward buying and diversions.  Suppliers use long term collaboration and 
contracts with customers to establish “everyday low pricing” that keeps demand 
stable.  Additionally, the proliferation of information systems has allowed 
downstream customers to monitor supply levels more closely.  This can reduce 
fear and forward buying under normal market conditions, although it does not 
address the problem of fear buying and gaming during a genuine shortage.  To 
address this, suppliers are beginning to create contractual agreements with 
customers that base rationing on past orders, which eliminates incentives for 
downstream customers to game the system by over ordering during a shortage 
(Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997). 
DISCUSSION 
 The majority of research into the bullwhip effect has examined its causes 
under normal market conditions.  After a disaster there are substantial fears about 
the availability of critical supplies.  This causes customers to engage in forward 
buying and gaming which are identified as key drivers of the bullwhip effect.  
Supply chains in disaster areas have to deal with extremely erratic demand, which 
has been likened to dealing with “the client from hell” (Arminas, 2005).  
Businesses cannot establish contractual rationing agreements with frontend 
customers after a disaster; therefore incentive policies must be developed in order 
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to ration products.  The most powerful, emergent and well understood of these 
incentive mechanisms are prices.  In times of shortage, retailers can raise prices, 
which signal a shortage to customers and incentivizes them to be frugal and not to 
attempt to game the system.  Although stable prices create demand stability under 
normal circumstances, price increases in times of shortage can be used to temper 
demand with customers where contracts cannot be established.  When APG 
legislation is implemented, this mechanism is removed and the bullwhip effect 
and its costs are increased. 
 The beer game is a representation of a business supply chain that mimics 
the real world behaviors which cause the bullwhip effect.  The beer game will be 
used as a representation of a supply chain to test the effects of APG legislation on 
the bullwhip effect.  The behavior and decision making used in the beer game can 
be modeled with system dynamics.  The equations for modeling the beer game 
behavior are discussed in the next section.   
2.5 SIMULATING THE BEER GAME WITH SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
INTRODUCTION 
 In order to model the effects of APG legislation on the bullwhip effect, a 
simulation of the ordering and replenishment processes of the beer game will be 
used.  Supply chains are complex systems that can create recurring behaviors 
based on their setup and feedback structures, making them appropriate for 
analysis through system dynamics.  The beer game provides an appropriate 
platform to test supply chain responses to demand shifts (Ackere, Larsen, & 
Morecroft, 1993, Strozzi, Bosch, & Zaldívar, 2007 & Joshi, 2000). The system 
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dynamics equations and models of the beer game are used to simulate a generic 
supply chain response to demand shifts.   
THE BEER GAME SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL 
 John Sterman from MIT developed a set of equations that mimic the 
heuristics that each player uses to place orders.  Sterman’s model is based on data 
collected from thousands of individuals who have played the beer game.  The 
decision parameters and equations dictating the behavior of the supply chain are 
given below.  The inventory level (    is a function of the incoming orders      or 
acquisition rate     , units sold      or loss rate      and initial inventory level 
(  ).  Note that the initial inventory level for the classic beer game is 12 units.  
The equation for inventory at time t is given by: 
           
 
 
              
Where    is integrated numerically: 
                      
The backlog (  ) is a function of orders placed      and units sold      
with initial backlog     .  Note that the initial backlog for the classic beer game is 
0 units.  The equation for backlog at time t is given by: 
             
 
 
           
Where    is integrated numerically: 
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The supply line gap is a function of the orders placed     , the incoming 
orders and initial supply line gap.  Note that the initial supply line gap for the beer 
game is 0 units.   
          
 
 
                   
Where      is integrated numerically: 
                          
The orders placed      are a function of the indicated order rate      .  
The indicated order rate       is a function of the expected losses from stock     , 
the difference between the desired stock and actual stock       and the difference 
between the desired supply line and the actual supply line (     .   
                   
                      
                            
        
            
           
            
 Where the weight factors are          .  The desired stock ( 
   are 12 in 
the standard beer game and the desired supply line (     is defined by: 
                                            
 An exponential smoothing forecasting method is used by each location in 
the supply chain to determine the indicated orders       for the upstream supplier.  
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The method uses historical demand data, which is given progressively less weight 
in the average as the entry gets older, thus older data has less impact on the 
average as time increases.  The demand forecast for each location is affected by 
the exponential smoothing weight factors A and B.  The values A and B are set to 
.26 and .088, respectively.   
                                                              
 The effective inventory       is used to gain insight into the true 
oscillations within the system.  The equation for effective inventory can be seen 
below. 
                  
The system dynamics simulation of the beer game based on Sterman’s 
equations was developed by Kirkwood at Arizona State University (Kirkwood, 
2010).  Vensim, system dynamics simulation software, was used to simulate the 
effects of the beer game. (Ventana Systems, 2010)  The demand forecasting 
heuristic in the simulation is modeled with the SMOOTH function, which is an 
exponential smoothing calculation.  The delays inherent in the system are 
modeled with the FIXED DELAY function.  The equations for the model can be 
found in Appendix A.   
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Figure 6 Beer game stock and flow diagram (Kirkwood, 2010)  
 The model is run for 36 time steps, simulating the standard 36 weeks that 
are played in the beer game.  Each location in the supply chain is made up of 
replicated processes at each location.  Starting from the top left, the ORDer 
variable is the demand at the retailer.  Demand starts at 4 units per week and is 
increased to 8 units in week 5 using the Vensim STEP function, the same way 
demand is increased in the beer game.  The placed and order rate variables, 
simulate the ordering heuristic of the location.  The demand forecast is created at 
the placed variable and the delay is imposed at the ordered variable.  Each 
location's ordering heuristic is done independently of one another, without 
collaboration, the same as the beer game.  The supply line (SupplyL), inventory 
(Inventory) and backlog (Backlog) are modeled as level equations.  The supply 
line accumulation is based on the forecast and determines the rate at which supply 
line accumulates.  The supply outflow equals demand unless there are not enough 
units in inventory plus incoming units for the week, in which case the orders are 
accumulate in backlog.     
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Figure 7 Beer game stock and flow diagram Pg.2 (Kirkwood, 2010) 
 The effective inventory (inventory – backlog) for each location and the 
total costs incurred is modeled.  The cost is based on the cost penalties incurred in 
the standard beer game.  There is a $0.50 cost for each unit of inventory held per 
week and a $1.00 cost for each unit of backlog per week.  This allows the costs of 
changes to be evaluated between test scenarios. 
DISCUSSION 
 The beer game model simulates the characteristic supply chain patterns of 
behavior, oscillation, amplification and phase lag, exhibited in the actual beer 
game.  Kirkwood’s model of Sterman’s equations provides a base model that can 
be used to test the patterns of behavior and their effects on inventory and backlog 
costs under different scenarios (Joshi, 2000).  The model of the beer game 
developed by Kirkwood will be used as the base to test the patterns of behavior 
and performance of a supply chain under APG legislation regulatory scenarios.  
The input demand patterns will be based off a dynamic demand and price model 
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(Whelan & Msefer, 2003).  Front-end demand at the retailer is based off the 
traditional macroeconomic supply and demand model.  This integrated model, 
discussed in Chapter 4 will be used to test the effects of APG legislation on the 
bullwhip effect. 
2.6 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING 
LEGISLATION 
INTRODUCTION 
 This section focuses on applying established macroeconomic analysis of 
price controls to APG legislation.  The model of macroeconomic supply and 
demand is commonly used by economists to evaluate the effects of price control 
legislation.  Economic work is prevalent in policy research because of the large 
amount of basic needs which communities rely on everyday and that markets 
provide.   Necessities such as gas, electricity, roofing, hardware, cleaning services 
and insurance are often completely dependent on “the market” to supply them.  
After a disaster some of these supplies are supplemented by non-native agencies 
such as NGOs and state and local governments, but ultimately local businesses 
will need to return to supplying these goods after the initial response to a disaster.   
The principles of economics are built on the fact that resources are limited 
and scarce and that humans unlimited wants cannot all be satisfied.  In its simplest 
terms, economics is a social science concerned with how to allocate or use limited 
resources so as to obtain the greatest fulfillment of society’s unlimited wants 
(McConnell & Brue, 2004).  The model state in equilibrium is said to be the most 
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efficient
1
 use of resources.  The macroeconomic model of supply and demand is 
often used to illustrate the effects of price controls on supply and demand 
(Roberts, 2004).  The traditional static supply and demand model allows for 
evaluation of the supply and demand rates under anti-price gouging (APG) 
legislation.   
SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODEL 
The economic model of supply and demand makes three assumptions.  
The classic supply and demand model assumes (1) a perfectly rational consumer, 
which means individuals will make choices that are the most beneficial to them. 
(2) Perfectly competitive markets where no participants are large enough to have 
the market power to set the price of a given product, and (3) free entry and exit 
from the market (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997).  Additionally, this model assumes 
that all factors other than price, such as changes in taste, income, the price of 
substitute goods, and the price of complementary goods that affect price are held 
constant.  This is a valid assumption in the short term because changes in price 
happen on a much smaller time scale than other factors which may affect supply 
and demand (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997).   
MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE CEILINGS 
In a competitive market with limited resources, economists postulate that 
resources are allocated to their highest value use through consumers tradeoffs 
                                                 
1
 Efficient has varying definitions, but economic efficiency refers to the use of resources so as to 
maximize the production of goods and services given a finite amount of resources. (O'Sullivan & 
Sheffrin, 2002) 
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between goods based on price.  A scarcity for a given good or service causes the 
price to increase and those who have the highest need for the good will be willing 
to pay the most.  The price for the scarce good is bid up until those who do not 
value it as much reach a price where an alternative is more appealing for the same 
price.  By this mechanism demand is driven down to equal the supply (Roberts, 
2004). 
In an environment where infrastructure is affected by a disaster, the costs 
of producing, distributing and selling goods are often increased (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2006).  Additionally, there are increased costs associated with 
redistributing goods from an intended location to an area of scarcity (Rockoff, 
2008).  Analysis of price controls during the gas shortages in the 1970s led to the 
general consensus that they lead to the following consequences (Montgomery, 
2007): 
 Savings to consumers from lower prices are dissipated by the costs of 
non-market allocation mechanisms, such as the cost of waiting.   
 Shortages are exacerbated because of diminished or eliminated 
incentives for producers to find replacement supplies and removal of 
incentives for consumers to ration the remaining supplies. 
 Available supplies are not directed to their highest value use, but 
instead to those who have the lowest costs of waiting. 
When disasters such as hurricanes occur, prices can rise due to supply 
shocks.  Prices also rise due to demand increases, as consumers hasten to 
purchase goods such as gas, generators, hardware and other building materials 
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(Davis, 2008).  Under APG legislation, when supply shocks occur, the price of a 
given good is held at the regular market equilibrium point, despite the system 
shifting into a state of disequilibrium.  The effect of this artificial disequilibrium 
state is that the supply provided is not equal to the amount demanded.  The 
incentive for the market to increase supply to fill the shortage is removed.  Figure 
8 below shows a static equilibrium model created to show the effects of a price 
ceiling regulated by APG legislation.   
 
Figure 8 Traditional supply and demand model of price ceilings 
Figure 8 above illustrates the supply and demand model under a scenario 
where a price ceiling        is held below the equilibrium price point after an 
increase in demand.  Under these conditions, the quantity supplied by the market 
          is held at the point below what the market would actually like to 
consume          .  The price control therefore creates an artificial shortage that 
is represented by the area shown under the curve in Figure 8.   
                                 
A second consequence of the price ceiling is the actual price (       ) of 
the good is below what the market will bear.  Therefore the cost of the good is 
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more than the amount that the retailer is actually charging.  The actual price under 
APG legislation is now determined by other market mechanisms, such as the cost 
of waiting           .  Under APG legislation, the actual cost of the good is 
determined by: 
DISCUSSION 
In an environment where there is perfect enforcement of APG legislation, 
the difference between the price ceiling and the actual price will be determined by 
the cost of waiting or queuing for the good.  When queuing is the sole rationing 
mechanism, the market clears with money plus waiting time cost (Barzel, 1997).  
Under APG legislation, each consumer of the good must make a rational decision 
on the time it will take to receive the good and the value of that good to them.   
The traditional model of supply and demand demonstrates the effects of 
APG legislation on supply and demand incentives.  When price ceilings are 
enacted, some other mechanism of allocating the scarce good will emerges in 
order to reduce demand to a given supply.  Legislators fail to account for APG 
legislation’s effect on private sector incentives to take on the risk of acquiring 
new lines of supply.     
2.7 SUMMARY 
 The purpose of this literature review was to determine an area of disaster 
management research that would benefit from increased research and to formulate 
a thesis problem to add that would add to the body of knowledge in this area.  The 
literature review research identified these key issues: 
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 Research into disaster recover planning is significantly lacking. 
 Anti-price gouging (APG) legislation is a type of state enforced price 
ceiling that affects business and consumer decision making after a 
disaster. 
 Research into APG legislation effects on local businesses is critical to 
ensuring local economic recovery from disasters. 
 Supply chains in disaster areas have to deal with extremely erratic 
consumer demand patterns. 
 Economic evaluation of price controls evaluates the effects o legislation 
on consumer and business incentives, but does not address the operational 
effects of APG legislation. 
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation into allegations of 
price gouging did not account for the increased costs of responding to 
volatile demand conditions in a disaster market. 
 During erratic demand patterns, the bullwhip effect significantly amplifies 
the inventory costs and reduces service levels in a supply chain. 
 Modeling of social and political policy issues on businesses is difficult 
because of their complex nature, nonlinearities and numerous intangibles. 
 System dynamics is a flexible simulation framework that can accept the 
relationships necessary to model in complex legislative and social 
environments.  
 Simulation of supply chain performance and costs can be accomplished 
using a system dynamics model of the beer game. 
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 Modeling of price effects on demand can be accomplished using dynamic 
economic supply and demand models. 
 System dynamics can integrate the models necessary to simulate the 
feedback loop effects of APG legislation on supply chain dynamics. 
 Based on the results of the literature review, the author has formulated the 
formulated the following hypothesis.  Anti-price gouging legislation increases 
businesses’ inventory costs, reduces service levels and distorts the need for 
capacity expansion, which hampers a community’s local economic recovery from 
a disaster.  This hypothesis will be tested using a system dynamics model to 
simulate the market effect on a supply chain under different legislative scenarios.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
The distinction between stocks and flows is well known… Yet 
economic theories still revolve primarily around flow concepts of 
supply and demand… [S]tock-variable concepts of supply and 
demand must be incorporated explicitly in economic models in 
order to capture the rich disequilibrium behavior characteristics of 
real socioeconomic systems. 
(Mass, 1980)  
INTRODUCTION 
Economic analysis of price ceilings applied to APG legislation show the 
effects on allocation costs and supply shortages stemming from price ceilings, but 
does not evaluate the operational costs of APG legislation on businesses.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to design a system dynamics model that simulates the 
effects of APG legislation on the operational costs of demand variation caused by 
a disaster with and without APG legislation.   
In the wake of a disaster, this thesis hypothesizes that prices plays an 
important role in smoothing demand by creating incentives which reduce forward 
buying and gaming.  Under volatile demand conditions where a shortage is 
unavoidable, prices adjustments aid in creating demand stability while the supply 
line capacity adjusts.  APG legislation removes price fluctuations that create 
demand stability, increasing costs for local businesses. 
SYSTEM DYNAMICS SIMULATION MODEL    
The simulation model for this thesis is designed to model the effects that 
APG legislation has on supply chain dynamics.  System dynamics was chosen as 
the simulation methodology of choice because of its ability to model and integrate 
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both operational, legislative and economic systems.  Vensim by Ventana Systems 
was used as the system dynamics modeling software to simulate the integrated 
market supply chain model (Ventana Systems, 2010).  The integrated market 
supply chain model simulates the effects of price fluctuations on demand 
variation and the resulting replenishment dynamics.   
The simulation model integrates the system dynamics model of a supply 
chain based on the beer game with a dynamic economic model of demand and 
price adjustment.  The price model of is based on a dynamic model of supply and 
demand (Whelan & Msefer, 2003).  The feedback loops in the market portion of 
the model are based on the causal loop diagram outlined in Figure 9 below.   
The casual diagram in Figure 9 shows that as inventory levels drop below 
the desired safety stock inventory levels, the retailer is incentivized to increase the 
price of a good to maximize profits.  Prices do not adjust immediately, so there is 
a delay between the desire to increase price and prices actually increasing.  As 
prices increase, the relative value to a market consumer decreases, increasing the 
appeal of substitute or delayed consumption.  This incentive then reduces the 
front-end demand rate for the retailer. 
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Figure 9 Causal diagram of dynamic supply and demand model 
 Figure 10 below shows the stock and flow diagram of the simulation 
model in Vensim.  The equations for the model can be found in Appendix A.  The 
sales of the retailer are a function of the demand from the market at a given price 
point.  The inability of the supply chain to supply the goods that are demanded by 
the market causes the retailer to raise their prices to maintain their desired level of 
inventory.  Conversely, if the retailer inventory level rises above the desired 
levels, there is a downward pressure placed on the price of the good in order to 
stimulate market demand and bring the inventory back to the desired safety stock 
level.  These price shifts affect the front-end demand, which is used as the 
demand input for the supply chain portion of the model.  The supply chain portion 
is designed with Sterman’s beer game equations and simulates the results of the 
beer game under different demand patterns.  The supply rate from the beer game 
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then feeds back into the market price calculation through the retailer’s inventory 
level relative to their desired inventory. 
 
Figure 10 Stock and flow diagram for market integrated supply chain model 
METRICS 
  In order to evaluate the performance and costs to businesses under 
different legislative scenarios, the metrics used to evaluate player performance in 
the beer game are used.  The supply chain        costs incurred are measured in 
the same way as the traditional beer game.  The equations used for the model are 
shown below.  The number of units sold to the market from the retailer      is 
based on the available retailer inventory, the retailer units received, the market 
demand and the retailer backlog. 
          
    
       
 
 
 
           
Where    is integrated numerically: 
              
    
       
         
The total supply chain cost is based on the inventory and backlog costs per 
unit per week.  Where   
   is integrated numerically: 
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The revenue      of the retailer is based on the price       of the product 
and the number of units sold to the market from the retailer      at time t.  Where 
   is integrated numerically and the initial price per unit is $3.33: 
  
       
               
The cost    
   at the retailer is based on the retailer inventory and backlog.   
Where   
  is integrated numerically: 
  
      
           
           
         
The results of these metrics along with the patterns of behavior are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
TEST CASES 
 Three test scenarios are used in order to simulate the effects of APG 
legislation on business costs.  The following are descriptions of the three test 
cases: 
 Case I:  No APG legislation and prices are allowed to be adjusted by the 
retailer based on the available inventory they have.  In Case I, the price-
change delay is set to 12 weeks or one quarter.   
 Case II: No price shift allowed in response to inventory.  The price-
change delay in Case II is modeled by moving the price-change delay to 
infinity, therefore creating a model where there is no price shift.   
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 Case III: This case is the scenario with APG legislation.  APG legislation 
creates a price ceiling at the initial price for the good.  The retailer price 
can only fluctuate below the initial price. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Modeling of social and legislative environments involves generalization of 
many complex interactions.  This simulation model for this thesis makes some 
simplifying assumptions in order to simulate the affects of APG legislation.  
Many of the assumptions are based off behavioral decision theory, rational choice 
and microeconomics that dictate the behavior of markets, firms and economic 
systems. The additional assumptions narrow the case in which these results can be 
held true. 
 The model uses a dynamic version of the economic model of supply and 
demand, which has the following assumptions.  (1) A perfectly rational 
consumer: individuals will make choices that are the most beneficial to 
them. (2) Perfectly competitive markets: no participants are large enough 
to have the market power to set the price of a given product.  (3) Free 
entry and exit from the market. 
 The simulation model assumes that a retailer is always trying to maximize 
their profits by charging the highest price possible while maintaining their 
desired inventory.  It is assumed that front-end suppliers do not sacrifice 
profit margin by discounting in order to sellout their inventory.  
Discounting by downstream suppliers is a one of the four key drivers of 
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the bullwhip effect, but is not included in the scope of the simulation for 
this thesis. 
 It is assumed that there are only two feedback processes pressuring 
inventory towards the desired level.  The first process is an increase or 
decrease the quantity ordered at the retailer based on the forecast, which 
pushes the supply rate toward the demand rate.  This creates a net change 
in the accumulation of inventory.  The second process is an increase or 
decrease in the price at the retailer, changing the demand rate for a 
product.  Combinations of these two strategies are used based on the 
delays in the feedback loop pressuring change.  In the real world there 
could be additional forces affecting supply and demand rates, but for the 
purposes of the simulation model for this thesis, they are not included. 
 Locations in the supply chain are assumed to always try to minimize their 
costs on a local level.  The assumption is that players attempt to keep their 
inventories as close to safety stock levels as possible. 
 The simulation equations are based off an assumption that the rate at 
which price and supply rates shift in the upward and downward direction 
are equal.  In reality the upward and downward shifts of price and supply 
may not be equal.  A retailer may be quick to discount inventory when the 
levels are above a desired level, but more reluctant to raise prices when 
there are stock outs because of the ill will this may create with customers.   
 There is an assumptions that the increase in demand caused by the disaster 
is only on the regional level and there are no supply and demand 
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adjustments based as a result of price at each upstream location in the 
supply chain.    
 It is assumed that a front-end consumer will return to purchase a good at a 
later time if the product is out of stock.  Effectively, there is backlog with 
front-end market consumers.  This may not always be the case.  If a 
product is out of stock, many consumers will not return again to purchase 
it when stock is returned. 
 It is assumed that prices between locations in the supply chain are held 
constant.  This could be through long-term contracts or single source 
suppliers.  By this assumption, the demand rate is based solely on 
downstream consumers forecast and are not affected by changes in price.   
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 The market integrated supply chain model was used to simulate the effects 
of price fluctuations on a supply chain response to a disaster.  The behavior of 
effective inventory, ordering, price, demand, units sold and financial performance 
for the retailer (R), wholesaler (W), distributor (D) and factory (F), respectively.  
For each location the results for each of the three test cases are overlaid on the 
graph.  In each section, analyses of each locations individual results are discussed 
first followed by an overall evaluation of the patterns of behavior; oscillation, 
amplification and phase lag. 
INVENTORY LEVEL RESULTS 
 
Figure 11 Effective inventory levels for Case I, II and III. 
The effective inventory is the inventory less the backlog.  Anytime the 
effective inventory is negative for a location, it means that the location has 
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backlog.  The phase lag in inventory levels can be seen by the peak inventory 
levels occurring later as one moves from the retailer to factory.  Quadrant I of 
Figure 11 shows the effective inventory results for the retailer location.  Note that 
the scale for this quadrant is from -20 to 200 units compared to the -400 to 400 
units in the other three quadrants.  The plot of the retailer’s inventory shows the 
large spike in inventory caused by the demand spike at the time of the disaster.   It 
is clear from the scenarios that there is increased variation in inventory levels 
without price fluctuations.  Under APG legislation, the retailer’s effective 
inventory drops to -19 units, compared to 1 unit without APG legislation.  The 
peak inventory under APG legislation is 159 units, compared to 30 units, without 
APG legislation.   
The wholesaler’s inventory in Quadrant II of Figure 11 shows the first 
signs of amplifications in oscillations.  The fluctuation at the wholesaler is less 
pronounced in Case I because of the reduced variation in ordering at the retailer, 
which can be seen in Quadrant I of Figure 12.  Quadrant III shows the inventory 
for the distributor, which has the highest range (-160 to 312) in inventory levels 
for Case III.  Quadrant IV shows the furthest upstream spike in inventory caused 
by the demand increase at the retailer.  The difference between inventory levels in 
Case I and III can be clearly seen at the factory location.  None of the locations 
have yet reached steady state equilibrium by the end of the 36 week simulation.  
The mean, median, minimum, maximum and range for each location in each case 
can be seen in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1 Effective inventory statistics summary 
The effective inventory clearly shows the phase lag in inventory levels 
between different suppliers.  The peak inventory level for the retailer is reached at 
week 26 and the peak inventory level for the factory is in week 30.  The largest 
range in effective inventory is 471 units (-159 to 312) at the distributor.  The 
following is an overview of the trends for each individual case: 
Case I: The characteristic oscillation and instability are present in this case, but 
no stock outs occur at the retailer.  The bullwhip effect has the least effect in this 
case because of the leveling effect on demand created through the change in 
prices. 
Case II: The bullwhip effect is very strong in this case.  This case has results that 
are similar to the results of the original beer game, where there are large 
oscillations and amplifications in inventory levels caused by a demand disruption.  
Figure 11 shows the bullwhip effect is very pronounced as you move further 
upstream in the supply chain. 
Case III: The bullwhip effect is also very strong in this case, which simulates a 
market with APG legislation.  When backed up orders are received and inventory 
Variable             Mean  Minimum  Median  Maximum   Range 
R Eff Inv Case I    15.55     1.14   15.49    29.86   28.72 
W Eff Inv Case I    19.28   -23.94   12.00    83.03  106.97 
D Eff Inv Case I     48.4    -69.9    12.5    138.1   208.1 
F Eff Inv Case I     46.2    -81.9    13.3    139.1   221.0 
R Eff Inv Case II    44.2    -19.4    12.0    162.3   181.8 
W Eff Inv Case II    51.2   -112.9    11.5    238.9   351.8 
D Eff Inv Case II    57.5   -158.9    12.0    312.4   471.3 
F Eff Inv Case II    48.8   -142.5    12.0    303.7   446.2 
R Eff Inv Case III  37.94   -19.43   12.00   159.13  178.56 
W Eff Inv Case III   51.0   -112.9    11.5    238.9   351.8 
D Eff Inv Case III   57.5   -158.9    12.0    312.4   471.3 
F Eff Inv Case III   48.8   -142.5    12.0    303.7   446.2 
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levels rise above desired levels safety stock levels, there is a divergence in 
behavior between Case II and III in week 26.  At this point the price at the retailer 
is decreased and market demand increases, which can be seen in Figure 14. 
ORDER RATE RESULTS 
   
  
Figure 12 Orders placed at each supply chain location 
Figure 12 shows the orders placed rate variable for each location.  Note 
the increasing y-axis scale of the plot at each location (0-40 units/week in 
Quadrant I increasing up to 0-200 units/week in Quadrant IV).    The 
amplification in order rate increases steadily from retailer to factory.  The phase 
lag behavior can be seen by the peak order rate occurring later as one moves from 
retailer to factory.  Quadrant I shows the smoothing effects that price fluctuations 
have on ordering patterns in Case I.  Case II and III show a steadily increasing 
number of orders per week after the demand spike in week 5, which drops off 
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sharply in week 20 once backed up orders finally arrive.  This is followed by an 8 
week period where there is no ordering.  Finally, in week 32 there is a divergence 
between Case II and II after discounts bring the inventory back below the safety 
stock level and the retailer begins to place order with the wholesaler again. 
Quadrant II shows the first signs of the bullwhip effects as the oscillations 
in ordering rates at the retailer are amplified at the wholesaler.  In Case I, peak 
order rates of 12 units/week are amplified to17 orders/week.  In Case II and III, 
peak order rates are amplified from 22 units/week at the retailer, to 45 units/week 
at the wholesaler.  This amplification continues at the upstream location, which 
can be seen in Quadrants III and IV of Figure 12.  Quadrant IV, shows the highest 
amplification in order rate, with a peak of 52 and 108 units per week for Cases I 
and III, respectively. 
 
Figure 13 Order absolute deviation from actual demand for Case I and Case III 
The orders are placed based on an exponential smoothing forecast of 
demand.  The orders placed at each location in the supply chain all still show the 
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characteristic bullwhip behavior, but the with price fluctuations, the bullwhip 
effect is significantly reduced.  Figure 13 above shows the deviations between 
actual demand and order rates for Case I and Case III.  The largest deviations 
from actual demand occur in Case III, which can be seen in week 22 of Figure 13 
above.  The deviations from actual demand in Case III are nearly double the 
deviations in Case I, without APG legislation.  The following is a summary of the 
patterns of behavior in each case. 
Case I:   The order rates in the supply chain display the characteristic bullwhip 
behavior, but not to the same extent as Cases II and III.  The range in ordering 
rates at the retailer is 11 units per week (1 to 12) compared to 48 at the factory (3 
to 51).  This is 4.3 times amplification in ordering rate from retailer to factory.  
The mean absolute deviation in orders from the actual demand was 1.9, 5.2, 8.9 
and 11.0 for the retailer, wholesaler, distributor and factory, respectively.   
Case II:  The bullwhip effect is again very pronounced in Case II.  The ordering 
rate oscillation range at the retailer is 22 units per week (0 to 22) and 108 at the 
factory (0 to 108).  This is a 5 times amplification in order rate.  The mean 
absolute deviation in orders from the actual demand was 7.3, 13.2, 21.5 and 29.1 
for the retailer, wholesaler, distributor and factory, respectively. 
Case III: The amplitude of order oscillations increases from retailer to factory.  
This bullwhip behavior is much more prevalent in this case compared with Case I.  
The results for this case are similar to Case III until week 32.  The order rate at 
the retailer in week 32 diverges from the Case II level and begins to rise again.  
The mean absolute deviation in orders from the actual demand was 7.8, 14.7, 22.9 
MAYNARD: THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMICS 
 
52 
 
and 30.3 for the retailer, wholesaler, distributor and factory, respectively.  The 
deviations between actual and perceived demand in Case III are more than double 
the deviations seen in Case I. 
UNITS SOLD, PRICE AND DEMAND RESULTS 
 
Figure 14 Demand and price results 
Figure 14 shows the demand at the retailer on the left and the market price for the 
goods on the right for Case I, II and III.  The demand spike in week 5 simulates 
the increase in demand for a good after a disaster.  In Case I the demand initially 
spikes, but immediately after, the increase in price begins to reduce demand back 
to its original levels.  Demand in Case III increases again in week 24 as inventory 
levels rise above the desired safety stock levels and the retailer market price is 
discounted, which can be seen in Figure 14 to the right.  In Case I, the demand is 
consistently lower than the demand in Case II and III throughout the 36 week 
simulation.  The market price is Case I is consistently higher than the price in 
Case II and III throughout the 36 week simulation. The following is a summary of 
the behavior in each case. 
Case I: The delay between the demand and price is apparent in Case I.  The 
demand for Case I spikes at the time interval 5 (the time of the disaster), but the 
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demand is then reduced because of the increase in price response.  The median 
demand is 5.2 units per week and the minimum is 3.5 units per week.  The price 
has a range of $4.16 ($3.33 to $7.50), a 125% increase. 
Case II & III: The demand and price response in Case II is the same as Case III 
until inventory levels rise above the desired safety stock level in week 24.  The 
price in Case III then rises.  Case III has a range of $2.50 ($0.83 to $3.33), a 73% 
decrease from pre-emergency price levels. 
 
Figure 15 Total units sold at retailer 
Figure 15 shows the total number of units sold through the retailer to the 
market in Cases I, II and III.  The retailer has total sales of 182, 260 and 301 units 
in Case I, II and III, respectively.  The cumulative fulfilled market demand is 
higher when prices are held at pre-emergency levels by APG legislation.  The 
units sold in Case III diverges from Case II, when inventory levels rise above 
safety stock levels and inventory is discounted, thus increasing demand.  In Case I 
the increased prices during the shortage reduces the demand and holds the 
cumulative units sold in Cases II and III.  The number of units sold in Case II and 
III is also higher, based on the assumption that front-end consumers will return to 
purchase the product at a later time if there is a stock out.       
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PLAYER PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
 
Figure 16 Retailer profit and revenue 
 Figure 16 shows the simulated cumulative profit and cumulative revenue 
at the retailer for Cases I, II and III.  The profit for the retailer shown on the right 
side dips significantly in Case II and III when the inventory levels spike in week 
24.  In Case I, the profit for the retailer is relatively constant throughout the 36 
week simulation. 
 
Figure 17 Total supply chain cost 
 Figure 17 shows the total supply chain inventory and backlog cost for the 
36 week simulation.  The costs in all three cases is approximately the same for the 
first 10 weeks of the simulation, but the costs for Case II and III trend steeply 
upward after week 15.  The following is a summary of the performance results of 
the simulation: 
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 The costs for the entire supply chain are $3,654.00, $8,191.00 and $7,690.00 
for Case I, II and III, respectively.    
 The revenue for the retailer is $958.00, $892.00 and 799.00 for Case I, II, and 
III, respectively.   
 The costs for the retailer are $297.00, $944.00and $821.00 for Case I, II and 
III, respectively.   
 The profit for the retailer is $661.00, -$52.00 and -$22.00 for Case I, II and 
III, respectively. 
DISCUSSION 
As hypothesized, the results of the simulation show increased oscillation, 
amplification and phase lag associated with the bullwhip effect are more prevalent 
with APG legislation.  The performance results show the deviations from optimal 
ordering patterns that the increased demand variation under APG legislation 
propagates.  In the simulation, the increase in the price of goods in response to the 
reduced inventory levels, tempers the demand levels to a sustainable rate of 
market consumption.  The results show that demand is held closer to the supply 
line rate and inventory levels adjust to their new equilibrium level, thus reducing 
inventory and backlog costs to the business.   
The inventory results in Case I, without legislation, show that the retailer 
location maintains 100% service levels.  In Case III, with APG legislation, there is 
a 62% service level.  This means 38% of the demand from the market is not met 
under APG legislation.  The simulation shows that the leveling of demand created 
by price fluctuations, maintains positive inventory levels.  In a disaster 
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environment this means that those who have the greatest need or value for the 
critical goods will have access to them when needed.  Despite the increased prices 
without APG legislation, there is only a 19% increase in revenue at the retailer, 
compared to a 217% increase in the cost of inventory and backlog for Case II and 
a 176% increase for Case III.  This rise in cost is dependent on the elasticity
2
 of 
the demand curve, but based on the assumption that the demand curve is always 
negative there will always be increased inventory costs with price rigidity.  
The simulation results show a 46% increase in the quantity of goods that 
are released to the disaster affected region.  Although more goods are moved to 
market with APG legislation, economic analysis presented in the literature review 
demonstrates that allocation is not based on value to the consumer, but instead 
goods are awarded to those with the lowest cost of waiting.   
Based on the researched costs of the bullwhip effect, removing APG 
legislation would reduce inventory expenditures and misguided capacity 
expansion caused by short term demand variance after a disaster.  Additionally, 
the retailer maintains higher service levels, ensuring that critical goods are 
available through the entire recovery.  For these reasons, the non-intuitive practice 
of allowing prices to fluctuate, which is typically thought to exacerbate the 
bullwhip effect, allows for demand smoothing that is beneficial to both consumers 
and businesses. 
                                                 
2
 Elasticity refers to the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a one percent 
change in price. 
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The market integrated supply chain simulation results show the increased 
costs associated with responding to volatile demand variations.  The performance 
results of the simulation show that there are costs associated with removing 
supplier’s ability to respond to supply and demand shocks.  Without APG 
legislation, customers benefit from higher service level rates, and incentives to 
reduce panic buying and gaming, which create more consistent supply 
availability.  Without APG legislation, businesses benefit from reduced inventory 
and capacity expenditures.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Most important, and most difficult to learn, systems thinking 
requires understanding that all models are wrong and humility 
about the limitations of our knowledge.  Such humility is essential 
in creating an environment in which we can learn about the 
complex systems in which we are embedded and work effectively to 
create the world we truly desire. 
(Sterman, 2002) 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to simulate the effects of anti-price gouging 
(APG) legislation on business supply chains during demand volatility created by a 
disaster.  It was hypothesized that APG legislation increases businesses’ inventory 
costs, reduces service levels and leads to misled capacity expansion, which 
hampers a community’s local economic recovery from a disaster.  This thesis 
contributed to disaster management research for the recovery phase of a disaster, 
which is the most underrepresented in the current literature.  A model based on 
economic analysis of price ceilings was used to show how price ceilings remove 
incentives for businesses to increase capacity and distort mechanisms to allocate 
goods to their most efficient economic use, but did not address the operational 
effects of APG legislation on businesses. 
This thesis focused on APG legislation’s contribution to the bullwhip 
effect by using a soft OR methodology and system dynamics simulation of a 
supply chain and market response to price fluctuations in a disaster shortage.  The 
system dynamics methodology was well suited to the creation of a dynamic 
mental model to illustrate the effects of prices on inventory costs and service 
levels.  The system dynamics framework was able to incorporate multiple 
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feedback loops necessary to test patterns of behavior in a supply chain model 
integrated with a dynamic pricing model.  The dynamic market simulation, based 
on the traditional supply and demand, was used to simulate how price shifts can 
assuage forward buying caused by fear and gaming in the case of a shortage 
created by a disaster.  Forward buying and gaming were identified as the main 
two of the four key drivers of costs propagated by the bullwhip effect in supply 
chains after a disaster.   
The increased costs associated with demand variation are not accounted 
for in investigations of price gouging done by the FTC.  Increases in prices are 
attributed solely to costs associated with redistributing of supplies.  The results 
from the system dynamics model created for this thesis show a 176% increase in 
inventory and backlog costs under APG legislation after a sudden doubling of 
demand after a disaster.  The increased costs from demand variation after a 
disaster will put strain on local businesses and their supply chain, retarding the 
recovery of local economies. 
This research has shown that price increases in response to a shortage 
create incentives for consumers to reduce behavior that causes demand variation 
when contractual agreements cannot be applied.  In addition to reducing 
incentives for local businesses to increase capacity, the results from the integrated 
market supply chain model show that APG legislation increases inventory and 
capacity expenditures and reduce service levels.  The conclusion of this thesis 
coupled with the research into the effects of price ceilings on supply incentives 
indicate that APG legislation is not an effective regulatory response to decrease 
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the impact of disasters on affected communities.  For this reason, this author 
recommends that APG legislation be removed and that government resources be 
applied to improving public sector aid to reduce the impact of prices on disaster 
areas.  
FUTURE WORK AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 This thesis, because of its limited time, focused only the effects of APG 
legislation on a supply chain behavior, but further research into legislation in 
disaster environments and disaster recovery planning is needed.  Especially 
critical to focus on for future research is how temporary aid can be used to 
supplement established supply chains after a disaster.  The author believes that a 
focus on supply management will yield a more effective solution to high prices 
created by supply shortages, without causing undue stress on local businesses.    
 The disaster recovery stage is still an area lacking in disaster management 
research.  The effects of government and NGO aid on local economics are areas 
in need of additional research.   Understanding of the tradeoffs between public 
sector, private sector or hybrid supply lines is needed.  Local businesses no doubt 
play an important role in the long term recovery efforts of a community, but there 
needs to be a better understanding of their roles and where there can be beneficial 
collaboration.  There must be increased communication between public and 
private sectors in the development of regulation and policy coordination and the 
direction of supplies after a disaster.  The coordination between public and private 
sectors can be a tall order because of private sector’s view of the public sector 
being slow and bureaucratic and the public sector’s view of the private sector 
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being only self-interested (Wassenhove, 2006).  There barriers must be overcome 
to foster coordination between government, NGO and business efforts 
immediately after a disaster to yield more sustainable and effective results for a 
community. 
 The recovery stage is where the contribution of local businesses can have 
the largest impact on improving humanitarian aid efforts.  Understanding how 
local businesses’ established infrastructures and supply chains can be leveraged to 
come up with long-term efficient recovery efforts is an important area for future 
research.    
Further development modeling business pricing processes are needed.  
This thesis uses a generalized macroeconomic pricing model, but research into the 
increased costs for businesses by industry is needed.  Markets that are dominated 
by futures speculation, such as energy resources, will have different price 
responses to shortages when compared to critical consumer goods markets.  For 
this reason, more detailed pricing models should be developed for particular 
product types or families.   
Lastly, information technology has been identified as a powerful demand 
management tool.  IT systems can not only help reduce the bullwhip effect, but 
aid in meeting volatile demand more effectively.  There is a need for research into 
how public and private sector information systems can be integrated and 
leveraged in both supply responses in order to meet critical aid demand.  
Technology such as EDI has been utilized in supply chains to reduce the bullwhip 
effect and subdue fears of shortages (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997).  It 
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would be beneficial to understand how IT systems could be leveraged to assuage 
fear of shortages and panic buying after a disaster.   Research into how 
information solutions can be used to communicate demand and supply data and 
reduce redundant supply activities between public and private sector responses is 
needed.   
This research has provided an operational perspective on one of the effects 
of APG legislation on supply chain dynamics.  This is a first step toward looking 
more closely at how legislation affects business processes in disaster 
environments.  The majority of legislative analysis is done from a high altitude 
macroeconomic standpoint and does not account for the effects on processes 
businesses use to make strategic replenishment decisions.  For this reason, the 
costs of legislation to businesses that play an important role in a community’s 
road to recovery are overlooked.  By modeling these effects, an enriched view of 
the effects of legislation on business performance can be understood and policy 
decisions can be improved.   
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APPENDIX A 
 (01) A = 0.25 
 (02) B = 0.33 
 (03) Backlog = INTEG(bFlow,0) 
 (04) Backlog 0 = INTEG(bFlow 0,0) 
 (05) Backlog 1 = INTEG(bFlow 1,0) 
 (06) Backlog 2 = INTEG(bFlow 2,0) 
 (07) bFlow = ORDer-sold 
 (08) bFlow 0 = ordered-sold 0 
 (09) bFlow 1 = ordered 0-sold 1 
 (10) bFlow 2 = ordered 1-sold 2 
 (11) coming = ordered 2 
 (12) Cost = INTEG(cost increase,0) 
 (13) cost increase = 1*(Backlog + Backlog 0+Backlog 
1+Backlog)+0.5*(Inventory+Inventory 0+Inventory 1+Inventory 2) 
 (14) Eff Env = Inventory-Backlog 
(15) Eff Inv 0 = Inventory 0-Backlog 0 
 (16) Eff Inv 1 = Inventory 1-Backlog 1 
 (17) Eff Inv 2 = Inventory 2-Backlog 2 
(18) FINAL TIME  = 36 
(19) in = DELAY FIXED(sold 0,2,4) 
 (20) in 0 = DELAY FIXED(sold 1,2,4) 
 (21) in 1 = DELAY FIXED(sold 2,2,4) 
 (22) in 2 = DELAY FIXED(coming,2,4) 
 (23) INITIAL TIME  = 0 
(24) Inventory = INTEG(in-sold,12) 
 (25) Inventory 0 = INTEG(in 0-sold 0,12) 
 (26) Inventory 1 = INTEG(in 1-sold 1,12) 
 (27) Inventory 2 = INTEG(in 2-sold 2,12) 
 (28) ORDer = 4+STEP(4,5) 
 (29) ordered = DELAY FIXED(placed,1,4) 
 (30) ordered 0 = DELAY FIXED(placed 0,1,4)  
(31) ordered 1 = DELAY FIXED(placed 1,1,4)  
(32) ordered 2 = DELAY FIXED(placed 2,1,4) 
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 (33) placed = MAX(0,SMOOTH(ORDer,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(Inventory-
Backlog)-B*SupplyL)) 
 (34) placed 0 = MAX(0,SMOOTH(ordered,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(Inventory 0-
Backlog 0)-B*SupplyL 0)) 
(35) placed 1 = MAX(0,SMOOTH(ordered 0,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(Inventory 1-
Backlog 1)-B*SupplyL 1 )) 
 (36) placed 2 = MAX(0,SMOOTH(ordered 1,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(Inventory 2-
Backlog 2)-B*SupplyL 2 )) 
 (37) SAVEPER  = TIME STEP 
(38) sFlow = placed-in 
 (39) sFlow 0 = placed 0-in 0 
 (40) sFlow 1 = placed 1-in 1 
 (41) sFlow 2 = placed 2-in 2 
 (42) SMOOTHTIME=1 
 (43) sold = MIN(Inventory+in,ORDer+Backlog) 
 (44) sold 0 = MIN(Inventory 0+in 0,ordered+Backlog 0) 
 (45) sold 1 = MIN(Inventory 1+in 1,ordered 0+Backlog 1) 
 (46) sold 2 = MIN(Inventory 2+in 2,ordered 1+Backlog 2) 
 (47) SupplyL = INTEG(sFlow,0) 
 (48) SupplyL 0 = INTEG(sFlow 0,0) 
 (49) SupplyL 1 = INTEG(sFlow 1,0) 
 (50) SupplyL 2 = INTEG(sFlow 2,0) 
 (51) TIME STEP  = 1 
Table 2 Vensim equations for beer game model (Kirkwood) 
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 (01) A = 0.26 
 Forecast parameter 
(02) B = 0.088 
 Forecast parameter 
(03) change in price= (desired price-price)/price change delay 
 Change in price can be positive or negative. If effect on price is > 1 then price 
will increase. If effect on price <1 the price will decrease. If effect on  price = 1 
then the price remains the same. The price change delay models the rate at which 
price changes 
(04) coming = F ordered 
 Materials that are in transit to the factory 
 (05) Cost = INTEG(cost increase,0) 
 The cost for the entire supply chain as a result of the inventory and backlog costs 
 (06) cost increase = 1*(R backlog+W backlog+D backlog+F backlog)+0.5*(R 
inventory+W inventory +D inventory+F inventory) 
 The weekly cost for the entire supply chain 
 (07) D backlog = INTEG(D bFlow,0) 
 The backlog for the distributor 
 (08) D bFlow = W ordered-D sold 
 The accumulation of backlog at the distributor 
 (09) D Effective Inventory = D inventory-D backlog 
 The effective inventory (inventory – backlog) of the distributor 
 (10) D inventory= INTEG (in 1-D sold, desired inventory) 
 The inventory at the distributor 
 (11) D ordered = DELAY FIXED(D placed,1,4) 
 Orders that have been placed the distributor that are in transit 
 (12) D placed = MAX( 0,SMOOTH(W ordered,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(D 
inventory-D backlog)-B*D supply line)) 
 Orders placed by the distributor 
 (13) D sFlow = D placed-in 1 
 The supply  line accumulation at the distributor 
 (14) D sold = MIN(D inventory+in 1,W ordered+D backlog) 
 Units sold by the distributor 
 (15) D supply line= INTEG ( D sFlow, desired supply line) 
 Supply line for the distributor 
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 (16) demand=demand price schedule*NORMAL DEMAND 
 The weekly demand from the market for a certain good 
(17) demand price Lookup([(0,0)-(4,2)],(0,2),(1,1),(2,0.5),(3,0.25),(4,0.2)) 
 Based on the demand curve. At some price (P), the consumers are willing and 
have the ability to purchase a unit at a certain rate. The lower the price; the 
higher the demand and vice versa. 
(18) demand price schedule= demand price Lookup(price ratio) 
  
(19) Demand Shock=4 
 The amount that demand increases at the time of the disaster 
(20) desired inventory=demand*desired inventory coverage 
 The inventory that the retailer wishes to carry 
(21) desired inventory coverage=3 
 The number of weeks the retailer wants their inventory to cover 
(22) Case I & II:  desired price=effect on price*price 
 Case III: IF THEN ELSE(effect on price*price< price, effect on 
price*price, price) 
 The price the retailer would like to charge at the current time based on current 
inventory levels 
(23) desired supply line=12 
 The desired supply line 
(24) effect on price=effect on price Lookup(inventory ratio) 
 This effect regulates price change. When inventory > desired inventory then the 
ratio is >1 and the price is reduced. If the inventory < desired inventory then the 
ratio is <1 and the price is increased. 
(25) effect on price Lookup( [(0,0)-(3,3)],(-
1,4),(0,3),(0.1,2.8),(0.2,2.6),(0.3,2.4),(0.4,2.2),(0.5,2),(0.6,1.8),(0.7,1.55),(0.8,1.3
5),(0.9,1.15),(1,1),(1.1,0.85),(1.2,0.75),(1.2,0.75),(1.3,0.65),(1.4,0.55),(1.5,0.5),(
1.6,0.45),(1.7,0.4),(1.8,0.35),(1.9,0.3),(2,0.25),(2.1,0.2),(2.2,0.15),(2.3,0.1),(2.4,0
.05),(2.5,0),(3,-0.6)) 
 (26) F backlog = INTEG(F bFlow,0) 
 The backlog for the factory 
 (27) F bFlow = D ordered-F sold 
 The backlog accumulation for the factory 
 (28) F Effective Inventory = F inventory-F backlog 
 The effective inventory (inventory – backlog) of the factory 
 (29) F in = DELAY FIXED(coming,2,4) 
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 The incoming orders for the factory 
 (30) F inventory= INTEG (F in-F sold,desired inventory) 
 The inventory at the factory 
 (31) F ordered = DELAY FIXED(F placed,1,4) 
 Orders that have been placed at the factory that are in transit 
 (32) F placed = MAX( 0,SMOOTH(D ordered,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(F 
inventory-F backlog)-B*F supply line)) 
 Orders placed by the factory 
 (33) F sFlow = F placed-F in 
 The supply  line accumulation at the factory 
 (34) F sold = MIN(F inventory+F in,D ordered+F backlog) 
 Units sold by the factory 
 (35) F supply line= INTEG ( F sFlow,desired supply line) 
 Supply line for the factory 
 (36) FINAL TIME  = 36 
(37) in 1 = DELAY FIXED(F sold,2,4) 
 (38) initial price=3.33 
(39) INITIAL TIME  = 0 
(40) inventory ratio= R inventory/desired inventory 
(41) NORMAL DEMAND= 4+ STEP(Demand Shock,5) 
(42) price= INTEG ( change in price, initial price) 
(43) Case I & III:  price change delay=12 
 Case II:  price change delay=2E6 
(44) price ratio=price/initial price 
(45) profit increase= price*R sold-0.5*R inventory-1*R backlog 
 (46) R backlog = INTEG(R bFlow,0) 
 The backlog for the retailer 
 (47) R bFlow = demand-R sold 
 The accumulation of backlog at the retailer 
 (48) R Effective Inventory = R inventory-R backlog 
 The effective inventory (inventory – backlog) of the retailer 
 (49) R inventory= INTEG (R received-R sold,desired inventory) 
 The inventory at the retailer 
 (50) R ordered = DELAY FIXED(R placed,1,4) 
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 Orders that have been placed at the retailer that are in transit 
 (51) R placed=MAX(0,SMOOTH(demand,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(desired inventory-
(R inventory-R backlog)-B*(desired supply line-R supply line))) 
 Orders placed by the retailer 
(52) R Profit= INTEG (profit increase,0) 
 The profit made by the retailer (price*units sold – costs) 
 (53) R received = DELAY FIXED(W sold,2,4) 
 The orders received by the retailer 
 (54) R sFlow = R placed-R received 
 The supply  line accumulation at the retailer 
 (55) R sold = MIN(R inventory+R received,demand+R backlog) 
 Units sold by the retailer 
 (56) R supply line= INTEG ( R sFlow,desired supply line) 
 Supply line for the retailer 
 (57) SAVEPER  = TIME STEP 
(58) SMOOTHTIME=1 
 Forecasting parameter 
 (59) sold= INTEG (R sold,0) 
 The cumulative number of units consumed by the market 
 (60) TIME STEP  = 1 
 Modeling parameter 
(61) W backlog = INTEG(W bFlow,0) 
 The backlog for the warehouse 
 (62) W bFlow = R ordered-W sold 
 The accumulation of backlog at the warehouse 
 (63) W Effective Inventory = W inventory-W backlog 
 The effective inventory (inventory – backlog) of the warehouse 
 (64) W in = DELAY FIXED(D sold,2,4) 
 Incoming orders at the warehouse 
 (65) W inventory= INTEG (W in-W sold,desired inventory) 
 The inventory at the warehouse 
 (66) W ordered = DELAY FIXED(W placed,1,4) 
 Orders that have been placed at the warehouse that are in transit 
 (67) W placed = MAX( 0,SMOOTH(R ordered,SMOOTHTIME)+A*(12-(W 
inventory-W backlog)-B*W supply line)) 
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 Orders placed by the warehouse 
 (68) W sFlow = W placed-W in 
 The supply  line accumulation at the warehouse 
 (69) W sold = MIN(W inventory+W in,R ordered+W backlog) 
 Units sold by the warehouse 
 (70) W supply line= INTEG (W sFlow,desired supply line)  
 Supply line for the warehouse 
Table 3 Vensim equations for the integrated supply chain model 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table 4 Effective inventory for Case I (No legislation) 
Time (Week) R Eff Inv Case I W Eff Inv Case I D Eff Inv Case I F Eff Inv Case I
0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
1.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
2.0 12.0 12.0 12.3 12.3
3.0 12.0 12.0 12.5 12.5
4.0 12.0 11.7 12.5 12.9
5.0 12.0 11.5 12.5 13.3
6.0 8.0 11.2 12.1 13.3
7.0 4.3 7.8 11.6 13.3
8.0 1.1 -0.3 11.0 12.6
9.0 1.7 -8.9 6.4 11.7
10.0 7.6 -17.4 -4.9 10.5
11.0 6.8 -20.6 -18.3 4.2
12.0 6.5 -18.6 -33.5 -11.4
13.0 10.7 -21.7 -42.8 -32.1
14.0 17.1 -23.9 -50.0 -57.8
15.0 17.4 -19.2 -60.4 -77.9
16.0 17.6 -14.1 -69.9 -81.9
17.0 22.9 -12.9 -69.6 -77.1
18.0 26.1 -11.4 -52.3 -62.3
19.0 25.2 -2.0 -24.1 -38.3
20.0 24.3 21.3 15.7 -8.4
21.0 29.9 54.1 64.5 28.9
22.0 27.4 81.8 114.3 73.5
23.0 23.5 83.0 135.3 111.2
24.0 20.3 80.0 138.1 133.3
25.0 15.8 75.3 138.1 139.1
26.0 12.4 69.4 138.1 139.1
27.0 10.8 62.1 138.1 139.1
28.0 10.7 53.9 138.1 139.1
29.0 12.5 45.5 138.1 139.1
30.0 15.5 37.7 138.1 139.1
31.0 18.8 31.1 138.1 139.1
32.0 21.6 25.8 137.0 139.1
33.0 23.1 21.6 135.3 139.1
34.0 22.9 19.1 133.7 139.1
35.0 21.5 17.3 132.0 139.1
36.0 19.1 15.1 130.4 139.1
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Table 5 Effective inventory for Case II (Price rigidity) 
Time (Week) R Eff Inv Case II W Eff Inv Case II D Eff Inv Case II F Eff Inv Case II
0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
1.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
2.0 12.0 12.0 12.3 12.3
3.0 12.0 12.0 12.5 12.5
4.0 12.0 11.7 12.5 12.9
5.0 12.0 11.5 12.5 13.3
6.0 8.0 11.2 12.1 13.3
7.0 4.0 7.8 11.6 13.3
8.0 0.0 -0.6 11.0 12.6
9.0 -0.9 -10.2 6.4 11.7
10.0 2.8 -20.9 -5.2 10.5
11.0 -1.4 -28.1 -20.0 4.2
12.0 -5.4 -32.4 -38.4 -11.8
13.0 -5.5 -44.2 -53.5 -34.3
14.0 -3.5 -57.1 -70.3 -64.4
15.0 -7.7 -65.1 -94.7 -93.0
16.0 -11.8 -74.4 -122.8 -111.0
17.0 -10.6 -88.9 -145.9 -126.1
18.0 -11.2 -104.3 -156.4 -136.4
19.0 -15.6 -112.9 -158.9 -141.6
20.0 -19.4 -107.8 -151.0 -142.5
21.0 -16.5 -91.8 -132.7 -135.3
22.0 0.5 -62.3 -105.7 -117.8
23.0 29.8 -20.4 -63.4 -89.3
24.0 74.2 33.2 -2.7 -49.7
25.0 130.3 107.5 75.8 5.2
26.0 160.6 203.7 174.4 78.1
27.0 162.3 231.4 277.3 169.4
28.0 154.3 238.9 309.6 244.9
29.0 146.3 238.9 312.4 293.5
30.0 138.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
31.0 130.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
32.0 122.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
33.0 114.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
34.0 106.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
35.0 98.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
36.0 90.3 238.9 312.4 303.7
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Table 6 Effective inventory for Case III (APG legislation) 
Time (Week) R Eff Inv Case III W Eff Inv Case III D Eff Inv Case III F Eff Inv Case III
0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
1.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
2.0 12.0 12.0 12.3 12.3
3.0 12.0 12.0 12.5 12.5
4.0 12.0 11.7 12.5 12.9
5.0 12.0 11.5 12.5 13.3
6.0 8.0 11.2 12.1 13.3
7.0 4.0 7.8 11.6 13.3
8.0 0.0 -0.6 11.0 12.6
9.0 -0.9 -10.2 6.4 11.7
10.0 2.8 -20.9 -5.2 10.5
11.0 -1.4 -28.1 -20.0 4.2
12.0 -5.4 -32.4 -38.4 -11.8
13.0 -5.5 -44.2 -53.5 -34.3
14.0 -3.5 -57.1 -70.3 -64.4
15.0 -7.7 -65.1 -94.7 -93.0
16.0 -11.8 -74.4 -122.8 -111.0
17.0 -10.6 -88.9 -145.9 -126.1
18.0 -11.2 -104.3 -156.4 -136.4
19.0 -15.6 -112.9 -158.9 -141.6
20.0 -19.4 -107.8 -151.0 -142.5
21.0 -16.5 -91.8 -132.7 -135.3
22.0 0.5 -62.3 -105.7 -117.8
23.0 29.8 -20.4 -63.4 -89.3
24.0 74.2 33.2 -2.7 -49.7
25.0 130.1 107.5 75.8 5.2
26.0 159.1 203.7 174.4 78.1
27.0 158.8 231.4 277.3 169.4
28.0 147.8 238.9 309.6 244.9
29.0 136.2 238.9 312.4 293.5
30.0 124.1 238.9 312.4 303.7
31.0 111.4 238.9 312.4 303.7
32.0 98.2 238.9 312.4 303.7
33.0 84.8 238.9 312.4 303.7
34.0 71.1 238.9 312.4 303.7
35.0 57.3 237.1 312.4 303.7
36.0 43.3 231.4 312.4 303.7
MAYNARD: THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMICS 
 
78 
 
 
Table 7 Orders placed for Case I (No legislation) 
Time (Week) R placed Case I W placed Case I D placed Case I F placed Case I
0 4 3.725440025 3.725440025 3.725440025
1 4 3.731721878 3.731721878 3.731721878
2 4 3.737860203 3.391914606 3.391914606
3 4 3.743857861 3.342357159 3.342357159
4 4 3.814822197 3.360489607 2.924598217
5 7.119999886 3.882673025 3.378136396 2.792273045
6 11.97138596 3.947515965 3.559371948 2.815954685
7 12.4063797 7.940652847 3.762739658 2.854948044
8 12.4593811 14.81834602 3.971005917 3.202818394
9 11.1280098 17.2192955 9.136832237 3.649114132
10 7.981572151 19.18172455 18.81424713 4.138630867
11 6.919100761 18.42187119 24.36952209 10.90837669
12 6.179563046 14.56627464 29.82001877 24.46846008
13 4.42991209 14.07727146 31.00104523 34.93469238
14 2.328831196 13.68072701 28.46346664 46.35773849
15 2.40320158 10.60331345 30.11803436 51.9517746
16 2.660075903 7.105215549 31.60802269 49.82408142
17 1.535063744 6.776573658 27.97768593 49.88564682
18 1.140218258 6.588666916 19.88485336 47.45999146
19 2.100631952 3.125429153 12.57944107 37.69916153
20 2.98110795 0 2.82442379 22.09955025
21 1.916862965 0 0 5.730269909
22 3.067676306 0 0 0
23 4.633711815 0 0 0
24 5.890757084 0 0 0
25 7.322517872 0 0 0
26 8.221029282 0 0 0
27 8.345720291 0 0 0
28 7.802650452 0 0 0
29 6.668833733 0 0 0
30 5.318812847 1.109237671 0 0
31 4.202859879 1.683938503 0 0
32 3.563123703 1.678280592 0 0
33 3.476257801 1.616672039 0 0
34 3.908203125 1.603336215 0 0
35 4.699773788 1.98431778 0 0
36 5.64404583 2.989040852 0 0
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Table 8 Orders placed for Case II (Price rigidity) 
Time (Week) R placed Case II W placed Case II D placed Case II F placed Case II
0 4 3.725440025 3.725440025 3.725440025
1 4 3.731721878 3.731721878 3.731721878
2 4 3.737860203 3.391914606 3.391914606
3 4 3.743857861 3.342357159 3.342357159
4 4 3.814822197 3.360489607 2.924598217
5 7.119999886 3.882673025 3.378136396 2.792273045
6 12.23138523 3.947515965 3.559371948 2.815954685
7 13.45971966 7.940652847 3.762739658 2.854948044
8 14.71615791 15.14594555 3.971005917 3.202818394
9 15.1187582 18.60660934 9.136832237 3.649114132
10 14.25373268 22.32749367 19.22702217 4.138630867
11 15.56152821 24.26723099 26.19326782 10.90837669
12 16.88090134 24.19006729 34.17839432 24.98855591
13 17.10088539 28.09816742 39.47908401 37.32803345
14 16.75328445 32.22208405 43.02814484 52.36412811
15 18.15219688 33.9845314 52.39200592 64.14469147
16 19.52420044 35.45531464 62.7135849 71.48815155
17 19.46628952 39.89730072 69.29052734 83.98706818
18 19.89213562 44.45138931 72.46903992 96.27597046
19 21.39500809 45.85107422 76.77501678 103.4556732
20 22.79378891 44.47451782 78.71327209 106.1577911
21 22.30954933 41.67128754 75.02328491 108.0813751
22 17.83123016 35.62643433 66.54229736 105.1832199
23 9.75985527 24.91755676 53.13610077 94.06128693
24 0 7.553972244 32.3094101 75.55703735
25 0 0 2.808450699 48.60923004
26 0 0 0 10.12976456
27 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0
33 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 0
MAYNARD: THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LEGISLATION ON SUPPLY CHAIN DYNAMICS 
 
80 
 
 
Table 9 Orders placed for Case III (APG legislation) 
 
  
Time (Week) R placed Case III W placed Case III D placed Case III F placed Case III
0 4 3.725440025 3.725440025 3.725440025
1 4 3.731721878 3.731721878 3.731721878
2 4 3.737860203 3.391914606 3.391914606
3 4 3.743857861 3.342357159 3.342357159
4 4 3.814822197 3.360489607 2.924598217
5 7.119999886 3.882673025 3.378136396 2.792273045
6 12.23138523 3.947515965 3.559371948 2.815954685
7 13.45971966 7.940652847 3.762739658 2.854948044
8 14.71615791 15.14594555 3.971005917 3.202818394
9 15.1187582 18.60660934 9.136832237 3.649114132
10 14.25373268 22.32749367 19.22702217 4.138630867
11 15.56152821 24.26723099 26.19326782 10.90837669
12 16.88090134 24.19006729 34.17839432 24.98855591
13 17.10088539 28.09816742 39.47908401 37.32803345
14 16.75328445 32.22208405 43.02814484 52.36412811
15 18.15219688 33.9845314 52.39200592 64.14469147
16 19.52420044 35.45531464 62.7135849 71.48815155
17 19.46628952 39.89730072 69.29052734 83.98706818
18 19.89213562 44.45138931 72.46903992 96.27597046
19 21.39500809 45.85107422 76.77501678 103.4556732
20 22.79378891 44.47451782 78.71327209 106.1577911
21 22.30954933 41.67128754 75.02328491 108.0813751
22 17.83123016 35.62643433 66.54229736 105.1832199
23 9.75985527 24.91755676 53.13610077 94.06128693
24 0 7.553972244 32.3094101 75.55703735
25 0 0 2.808450699 48.60923004
26 0 0 0 10.12976456
27 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0
33 1.814983368 0 0 0
34 5.733280182 0 0 0
35 9.696269989 0 0 0
36 13.70718861 0 0 0
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APPENDIX C 
 
Playing the Game 
The game is played on a board that portrays the production and distribution of 
beer (figures 1-2). Each team consists of four sectors: Retailer, Wholesaler, 
Distributor, and Factory (R, W, D, and F) arranged in a linear distribution chain. 
One or two people manage each sector. Pennies stand for cases of beer. A deck of 
cards represents customer demand. Each simulated week, customers purchase 
from the retailer, who ships the beer requested out of inventory. The retailer in 
turn orders from the wholesaler, who ships the beer requested out of their own 
inventory. Likewise the wholesaler orders and receives beer from the distributor, 
who in turn orders and receives beer from the factory, where the beer is brewed. 
At each stage there are shipping delays and order processing delays. The players' 
objective is to minimize total team costs. Inventory holding costs are 
$.50/case/week. Backlog costs are $1.00/case/week, to capture both the lost 
revenue and the ill will a stock out causes among customers. Costs are assessed 
at each link of the distribution chain. 
The game can be played with anywhere from four to hundreds of people. Each 
person is asked to bet $1, with the pot going to the team with the lowest total 
costs, winner takes all. The game is initialized in equilibrium. Each inventory 
contains 12 cases and initial throughput is four cases per week. In the first few 
weeks of the game the players learn the mechanics of filling orders, recording 
inventory, etc. During this time customer demand remains constant at four cases 
per week, and each player is directed to order four cases, maintaining the 
equilibrium. Beginning with week four the players are allowed to order any 
quantity they wish, and are told that customer demand may vary; one of their jobs 
is to forecast demand. Players are told the game will run for 50 simulated weeks, 
but play is actually halted after 36 weeks to avoid horizon effects. 
Each player has good local information but severely limited global information. 
Players keep records of their inventory, backlog and orders placed with their 
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supplier each week. However, people are directed not to communicate with one 
another; information is passed through orders and shipments. Customer demand 
is not known to any of the players in advance. Only the retailers discover 
customer demand as the game proceeds. The others learn only what their own 
customer orders. 
These information limitations imply that the players are unable to coordinate 
their decisions or jointly plan strategy, even though the objective of each team is 
to minimize total costs. As in many real life settings, the global optimization 
problem must be factored into subproblems distributed throughout the 
organization. 
The game is deceptively simple compared to real life. All you have to do is meet 
customer demand and order enough from your own supplier to keep your 
inventory low while avoiding costly backlogs. There are no machine breakdowns 
or other random events, no labor problems, no capacity limits or financial 
constraints. Yet the results are shocking. 
(Sterman, 1992) 
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APPENDIX D 
State Year 
Passed 
Fines Goods 
Covered 
Triggering 
Event 
Criminal 
Penalties 
Ceiling 
AL 1996 $1,000/viola
tion; 
$25,000 
max fine for 
24 hours 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None 25% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
AR 1997 Provided in 
law 
General 
goods and 
services 
President, 
gov. or 
locally 
declared 
SOE 
Provided in 
law 
10% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
CA 1994 $10,000 or 
less 
General 
goods and 
services 
President, 
gov. or 
locally 
declared 
SOE 
<1 year in 
prison 
10% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
CT 1986 $1,000 or 
less 
Goods and 
energy 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
<1 year in 
prison 
Pre-emergency 
prices 
FL 1992 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
GA 1995 <$10,000/ 
transaction 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
HI 1983 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE / 
Severe 
weather 
warning 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
IA 1993 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
"Disaster" None Pre-emergency 
prices 
ID 2002 Unspecified Food, fuel, 
pharmaceuti
cals, water 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
IN 2002 <$1000/ 
transaction 
Fuel Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
KS 2002 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None 25% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
KY 2004 <$5,000 for 
1st 
violation, 
<$10,000 
afterwards 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
LA 1993 Provided in 
law 
General 
goods and 
services 
President, 
gov. 
declared 
Provided in 
law 
Pre-emergency 
prices 
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SOE or 
hurricane 
threat in 
Gulf 
MA 1990 Unspecified Petroleum "Market 
emergency" 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
ME 2006 Provided in 
law 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
"abnormal 
market 
disruption" 
None 15% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
MO 1994 Unspecified "Necessities
" 
Not clearly 
specified 
None "Excessive 
prices" 
MS 1986 <$500 General 
goods and 
services 
SOE (no 
declaration 
required) 
0-5 years in 
prison 
Pre-emergency 
prices 
NC 2003 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None "Unconsciona
bly excessive" 
prices 
NJ 2001 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
President, 
gov. or 
locally 
declared 
SOE 
None 10% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
NY 1979 <$10,000 
and 
restitution 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
OK 1999 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None 10% above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
OR 2007 NA NA NA NA NA 
PA 2006 <$10,000/ 
violation 
plus 
restitution 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
SC 2002 <$1,000 General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
<30 days in 
prison 
Pre-emergency 
prices 
TN 2002 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
TX 1995 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
SOE 
None "Excessive or 
exorbitant 
prices" 
UT 2005 <$1,000/ 
violation or 
$10,000 
total 
General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
VA 2004 Unspecified General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
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VT 2006 Unspecified "Petroleum 
or heating 
fuel 
products" 
"abnormal 
disruption of 
any market 
for 
petroleum 
products or 
heating fuel 
products" 
None Pre-emergency 
prices 
WI 2006 <$10,000 General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. 
declared 
"abnormal 
economic 
disruption" 
None "Excessive 
prices" 
WV 2002 <$1,000 General 
goods and 
services 
Gov. or 
President 
declared 
SOE 
< 1 year in 
prison 
10 % above 
pre-emergency 
prices 
Table 10 Anti-price gouging legislation by state (Davis, 2008) 
 
